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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW

AND

RESPONSIBILITY

IN

WARFARE:

THE

VIETNAM

EXPERIENCE.

By Peter D. Trooboff (ed). Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press (1975). Pp. 280. $13.95.
War is the final political means to settle a disagreement. The
paradox of a total effort to destroy the enemy in a civilized manner has bred many gray areas in the Laws of War.
This volume focuses upon the difficulties of interpreting, and
insuring compliance with the Laws of War. The methods, means,
and weapons of warfare are constantly changing. Technology and
the response to that technology by less advanced belligerents has
pushed the nations of the world to reassess and qualify the Laws
of War. This text uses the Vietnam War as the stage to raise
the controversial issues of a humanitarian war. That experience
raised questions as to the legal methods of counterinsurgency,
the limitations upon weaponry, and the individual's responsibility
for transgressing ill-defined guidelines on brutality.
The editor divides the book into three main sections. Part One
deals with the methods and means of warfare. Part Two discusses
the weapons of warfare; and Part Three covers the individual
responsibility in warfare. Each of these sections is a balanced
account of the legal issues raised by the Vietnam experience.
The contributors to this collection are the leading participants in
the national debate about the conduct of the Vietnam War. The
editor's open forum approach allows the supporters and the
critics of the war to present their views and to rebut the opposing
viewpoint.
The contributors examine the customs of war, then present
strong arguments to support their view. The basic disagreement
concerns what restrictions, if any, have become customary obligations binding on the United States, even though such restrictions are not part of treaties to which the United States is a
party.
Because of the reliance upon custom and usage, the editor
outlines the reasons and historical development of the rules of
war in an introduction. The outline is a concise, comprehensive
summary of the codified laws that govern armed conflicts and
assert humanitarian values to be considered during warfare. The
summary suggests that the Vietnam issues are not unique, but
are recurring problems in warfare.
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One of the principal questions raised concerning the application of the Laws of War in Vietnam, is whether or not a highly
technological counter-insurgent may use its highly advanced
weapons against a low technology insurgent. An ancillary question is whether this disparity causes insurgent irregulars to disregard the Laws of War and not wear "fixed distinctive signs recognizable at a distance." This issue in turn raises questions as
to whether relocation and resettlement is an appropriate remedy
for that response; the legality of "free fire zones"; and the allowable circumstances for an armed force to fire upon inhabited
villages.
Basic to the answers to these questions is the doctrine of military necessity, but its scope is unclear. That doctrine is particularly unclear as to when military necessity becomes politically
motivated. This text deals with that issue in an extensive analysis of the legality of the 1972 Christmas bombings of Hanoi.
The second principal issue raised concerns the use of controversial weapons such as napalm, lachrymatories, and herbicides.
This is the area in which the paradox of war is the strongest. At
what point does a weapon exceed its function of demobilizing the
enemy and become an instrument of brutality? What should the
ground rules be for declaring them illegal? Professor Tucker
concludes that customary law prohibits the use of all chemical
weapons with either lethal or lastingly injurious effects. The issue then becomes whether lachrymatories and herbicides have
those effects. The effects of napalm (burning and adhesive
properties) cause some to argue that it should be totally prohibited in armed conflicts. Others view napalm as a practical weapon to destroy the military capabilities of the enemy. The compromise argument proposes a United Nations study to determine
whether it is necessary to prohibit napalm. A United Nations report found that no rule prohibits the use of napalm upon selected
targets.
The third principal issue involves the responsibility of the individuals who were in command during the Vietnam War. Emphasis is placed upon World War II and the post-World War II
ramifications of Nuremburg. The contributors treat the concept
of liability as extending beyond the officer at the battlefront. It
includes the chain of command and civilian leaders. But there is
still room for disagreement because the crimes of Hitler clearly
were the extreme. The contributors present conflicting views on
the standard of criminal responsibility that officers bear for the
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unlawful actions of their men. Professor Wasserstrom poses perceptive questions concerning the precise motive, purpose, and
knowledge of civilian or military leaders that should be required
in order to hold them liable for crimes against peace.
Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The Vietnam Experience serves
as a balanced study of the controversial methods and weapons
used in the Vietnam War. The contributors present the reader
with an excellent array of primary authority on the conflicting
approaches in interpreting the Laws of War.
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